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INTRODUCTION
In the century and a half following the discovery of the first Neanderthals, the focus of palaeoanthroplogy has been on the who's who of hominid evolution. How species are defined has come to occupy the central place in that story, with anatomy perhaps inevitably being the central plank of that endeavor. As appropriate as this has been, it does overlook the fact that what makes us human is not our bodies but our minds. The story of hominid?and hence ultimately human?evolution is thus one that must be told in terms of the evolution of mind. As Lewis-Williams It is important to appreciate in this context that the contrast between the so cial and more traditional ecological/technological hypotheses is not a question of whether or not ecology influences behavior, but rather is one of whether ecolog ical/survival problems are solved explicitly by individuals acting on their own or by individuals effecting social (e.g., cooperative) solutions to these problems. In both cases, the driving force of selection derives from ecology, but the solution (the animals' response to the problem) arises from contrasting sources with very different cognitive demands (individual skills in one case, social-cognitive skills in the other).
I first briefly summarize attempts to test between alternative hypotheses as to why some primates might have larger neocortices than others, and then I consider some of the implications of these findings for cognitive and social evolution within the hominids. In the latter respect, I consider principally the implications for social group size, language evolution, and core aspects of social cognition. Although the hypothesis has been tested by determining how neocortex volume constrains group size and other social indices, the evolutionary logic is that the need to main tain coherent groups of a particular size has driven neocortex volume evolution through its demands on cognitive competences. The most succinct and parsimo nious causal sequence with fewest unsupported assumptions is that the window of opportunity provided for more intensely bonded social groups and the social skills that underpin this was the crucial selection pressure for the evolution of large brains, even though simple ecological pressures (e.g., the shift to a more frugivo rous diet) may have been instrumental in kicking off the process. In these terms, any associated ecological skills may be seen as the outcome of the opportunity provided by an increase in general purpose intelligence generated off the back of the social requirements. To argue the reverse sequence (that large social groups are a by-product of having evolved large brains to solve simple ecological problems) is, as with the various ontogenetic hypotheses, to leave unanswered the problem of the costs of social living.
THE SOCIAL BRAIN HYPOTHESIS
Attempts
SOCIAL VERSUS NONSOCIAL COGNITION
The relationship between indices of social competence and neocortex volume raises questions as to the cognitive mechanisms involved. Social cognition is broadly taken to be synonymous with the phenomenon known as theory of mind (or ToM), the ability to appreciate that another individual has a mind that controls its behavior that cannot be accessed directly but which can be modelled mentally 
THE SOCIAL BRAIN IN HOMINID EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY
We can use the findings discussed above to throw some light on at least three key as pects of hominid evolutionary history. These are the evolution of social group size, the origins of language, and the origins of culture. I deal briefly with each in turn. This increased efficiency arises from at least three key features of language. One is that several individuals can be "groomed" at once, in contrast to conventional grooming where only one individual can be groomed at any one time (a problem we still encounter when we resort to the human equivalent of grooming, namely cuddling and petting). The second is that it is possible to timeshare with speech in a way that is not possible with grooming: We can talk and walk or feed, whereas grooming is an exclusive activity (even in modern humans). Third, language allows us to exchange information about events within our social network that happened during our absence: For nonhuman primates, what they do not themselves see they never know about. As a result, humans are able to maintain a better knowledge database on a larger social network than any nonhuman primate.
Social Group Size
We can use the regression equation relating social grooming time to group size to estimate grooming time requirements for fossil hominids and, in this way, gain some insight into when language might have evolved. This involves four levels of intentionality (marked by the italicized words). Making religion a social as opposed to individual phenomenon thus adds significantly to the cognitive load needed to underpin it. Without working at this level, we will be unable to ensure that our actions are coordinated (as in the performance of rituals) or that we can agree that infringements of the social mores are to be discouraged (i.e., to accept adherence to social norms without the need for punishment). In contrast, conventional interpersonal attempts to insist that you adhere to a social norm require only three levels of intentionality (I intend that you believe that you must behave in the way that the rest of us want). It is the reference to an external supernatural world that cannot be immediately apprehended that adds the key extra layer of intentionality that pushes the cognitive demand to the limits of normal human capacity at level 4. 
